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MARKETS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION
Abstract
The work discusses a basic proposition in the theory of competition in mar-
kets with adverse selection (Bester, 1985). By working out the sequence of
market transactions, we show that the e¤ectiveness of collateral in avoiding
equilibrium rationing depends on an assumption of uncontestability of the
loan market. If contestability is restored to its proper place, the separation
of borrower by means of su¢ cient collateral does not impede the emergence
of credit rationing, which results from a coordination failure among risk-
neutral banks. As a consequence, even in a risk-neutral environment with
suitable endowments, the use of collateral in credit contracts could not be
a socially e¢ cient screening-device. Our conclusion on rationing does not
stand in contrast with the general result of Gale (1996).
1. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Bester (1985), it has been generally taken for granted
that in a risk-neutral environment, when su¢ cient wealth is made available
from a borrowers endowment, the competitive equilibrium of the credit mar-
ket achieves perfect sorting, thus solving the adverse selection problem posed
by Stiglitz-Weiss (1981). In other words, the separation of borrowers, that
is accomplished by means of unlimitedcollateral, impedes equilibrium ra-
tioning. This conclusion has become a real cornerstone in the literature on
credit markets with asymmetric information, as it has been shared by several
diverse contributions (e.g., Bester 1987, Besanko-Thakor 1987, Hellwig 1987,
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Stiglitz-Weiss 1992, Schmidt-Mohr 1997), and it has also been recalled by au-
thors dealing with the more general problem of competition in markets with
adverse selection (Gale 1996). Our paper discusses this proposition by render-
ing explicit the whole sequence of market transactions, and considering the
symmetric incentive-compatible equilibrium of the resulting market game. We
point out that Besters claim relies on an ad hoc assumption, which removes
contestability of the loan market in presence of a rationing equilibrium. In
fact, an articial restriction of the strategies of the incumbent banks is be-
ing imposed, while this restriction does not equally hold for the no-rationing
equilibrium. Conversely, if the game is correctly specied, in the sense that
the same extensive form and the same unrestricted strategy set is being con-
sidered for both kind of possible equilibria (rationing and no-rationing), then
Besters conclusion is not valid. The result extends easily to the case in which
a recourse opening of the credit market is being added. Then, a competitive
equilibrium with separation of borrowers can in fact show rationing of their
demand for credit, even when they have su¢ cient collateral. As a direct conse-
quence, one has that collateralization may turn out to be a socially-ine¢ cient
instrument to screen a borrowers riskiness. The paper is organized as follows:
in section 2, we illustrate the basic model; in section 3, we introduce the de-
nition of equilibrium and the extensive form of the game; section 4 deals with
the central issue of the presence of rationing in an equilibrium; nally, section
5 discusses the results of our analysis and their relationship with the above
mentioned strands of literature.
2. The model
Given his purpose, Bester 1 obviously employs a model that reproduces the
1 In the following, when we mention Bester without any further indication we mean
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same basic structure of Stiglitz-Weiss analysis. All agents are risk-neutral and
there are two types of entrepreneurs or rms. Each entrepreneur has a xed-
scale investment opportunity, while the random returns of investments of the
two classes of rms are ordered according to the mean preserving spread cri-
terion (mps) 2 . Banks cannot directly observe the type of borrower they deal
with, so adverse selection may arise. The supply of deposits to the banking
system is a continuous and strictly increasing function of the rate of interest
paid on deposits. In a credit contract, banks may charge collateral as a guar-
antee for loan repayments when the borrower defaults. Pledging collateral is
costly to borrowers, who face a generic and constant unit cost. Moreover, they
have a collateral endowment which is more than su¢ cient to fully guarantee
the loan value. Symbols are as follows:
I is the xed scale of investment, eRi is their random return, taking values in
[0;
 
R], where i = a; b stands for the type of rm we are considering; Fi(R) > 0,
8R > 0, is the distribution function: assuming that type b entrepreneurs are
more risky than type a, in the sense of a mean-preserving spread, we have
E
n eRao = E n eRbo ; R y0 [Fb(R)  Fa(R)] dR = 0; 8y 2 0;  R; W is the initial
endowment of monetary wealth each entrepreneur can dispose of ( W < I),
B = I  W is the amount of funds needed to start any investment project;
LS() is the supply function of deposits; nally C and r denote, respectively,
the collateral and the nominal rate of interest charged on a loan, k is the unit
cost of collateral and  is the rate of interest banks pay on deposits. There are
Ni entrepreneurs of type i. Note that the non-monetary wealth entrepreneurs
the 1985 article.
2 Bester (1985, p. 851). On the denition of mean preserving spreads see Rothschild-
Stiglitz (1970).
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can o¤er as collateral is separated from their monetary holdings.
The debt contract the banks use to lend funds to rms declares the borrower
to be insolvent anytime the sum of total return on investments and collateral
is not su¢ cient for loan repayment: that is when Ri + C < B(1 + r). In this
circumstance the bank seizes the whole disposable value Ri + C, otherwise it
gets the contractual repayment B(1 + r). Bester considers only contracts for
which the collateral does not exceed the face value of the loan C  B(1 + r)
(otherwise default would be trivially excluded from the model). The banks
expected rate of return on a loan contract   (r; C) to borrower i is
i() = E
n
min
h
B(1 + r); eRi + Ci Bo =B (1)
From the same contract, entrepreneur i expects to gain a total prot which is
given as
i() = E
n
max
h eRi  B(1 + r)  kC; (1 + k)Cio (2)
For C < B(1 + r), the mps ordering implies that
a() > b() (3)
and
b() > a() (4)
For a given contract , a bank obtains a higher rate of return on a loan to a
less-risky borrower, while the utility of a riskier borrower is higher than that
of a safer one.
Totally di¤erentiating expressions (1) and (2) with respect to r and C, and
simplifying, we get the following marginal rates of substitution
i() =   Fi(B(1 + r)  C)
B[1  Fi(B(1 + r)  C)] (5)
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and
i() =   Fi(B(1 + r)  C) + k
B[1  Fi(B(1 + r)  C)] (6)
These ratios clearly indicate that each kind of borrower has an indi¤erence
curve which is steeper in absolute value than its isoprot curve, because
i() < i(). Moreover, it can easily be shown that both the isoreturn curves
are strictly convex, so that functions i() are quasiconvex. The property is
not grasped by Bester, who believes these curves not to be concave every-
where 3 . However, in this model, a su¢ cient condition to obtain a separating
equilibrium is represented by Fb(R) > Fa(R); 8R 2 [0; B(1 + r)  C], an
assumption which amounts to establishing a single-crossing property for the
isoreturn curves. In fact, for any given contract, we immediately get that the
indi¤erence curve of riskier investors, those of type b, becomes steeper than
that of less risky investors, b() < a(). The same goes for the isoprot
curves. Thus, the separate indi¤erence (or isoprot) curves will have one in-
tersection point at most. As far as their shape is concerned, in what follows it
will be more convenient to adopt Besters representation. Finally, two impor-
tant features of his model have to be emphasized:
Assumption 1: banks act as perfect competitors, that is, each bank takes
the rate of interest  on deposits and the set of credit o¤ers by competing
banks as given and as independent of its own actions;
3 Convexity of the isoreturn curves holds when we consider both a continuous
and a discrete random variable. On the contrary, Bester believes these curves to
have mainly a concave behaviour, which in turn implies that the expected utility is
quasiconcave. See Bester (1985), note 8, p. 851, and gures 1 and 2 -respectively at
p. 852 and following. Standard renditions of this model employ concave isoreturn
curves; cf. Goodhart (1989) and Freixas-Rochet (1998).
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Assumption 2: an entrepreneur who is rationed at his preferred contract
may successively apply for the other contract at the same bank 4 .
As we shall see later on, assumption 2 is crucial for obtaining Besters conclu-
sion on the absence of rationing.
3. Denition of equilibrium and the extensive form of the market
game
We are now going to get a preliminary insight into the basic denition of
equilibrium and into the sequence of transactions, that are featured by the
model we have just presented.
Denition 1
A credit market equilibrium is a situation in which borrowers choose among
contracts to maximize expected prots: (i) each contract  and 

 yields zero
prot to the bank; (ii) any additional credit o¤er  will make no prots; and
(iii) there is no excess supply of funds5 .
This equilibrium is shortly denoted as a tuple f(; ); (; ); g, where
j, 0 < j  1 j = ; , is the fraction of rms that receive credit under the
terms of j, that is to say each rms identical probability of getting credit 6 ;
4 Bester (1985), p. 852 (In the following, it will be assumed....). Please note that
assumption 2 would have no sense if borrowers were allowed to apply to a di¤erent
bank for the remaining contract. Because they are not known, in this eventuality
type a entrepreneurs would rather apply to a new bank for their preferred contract.
See g. 1 below.
5 Bester (1985), p. 852.
6 Besters credit rationing is that of type II (see Keeton 1979), because some
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moreover, by requirement (i), i(j ) = 
. Credit rationing occurs if some
entrepreneur i faces a positive probability of being rejected at contract j ,
which he prefers, and at the same time i(j ) > W (1 + 
). Notice that
the sign of strict inequality comes from the need to satisfy entrepreneurs
participation constraint to the credit market:
ji(

j )  W (1 + ) (7)
where the second term is the alternative return the entrepreneur can get from
his monetary wealth; this condition is also known as the individual rationality
constraint (IR). In an equilibrium with separation of di¤erent borrowers, their
incentive-compatibility constraints (IC) must also hold:
a(

)  a() (8)
b(

)  b() (9)
This equilibrium is depicted in g.1, where a and b represent the borrowers
indi¤erence curves while  and  denote a banks isoprot curve of the cor-
responding type. As long as the proportion between high-risk and low-risk
borrowers is so high as to exclude the existence of a dominating pooling con-
tract 7 , the competitive equilibrium - a Nash equilibrium - exists, and is given
by the separating equilibrium shown in g. 1, (; 

). Besters contention is
that in this framework there can be no rationing of any type of borrowers at
(; 

), that is to say 

 = 

 = 1. To address this issue, it will be useful
randomly-chosen borrowers obtain no credit at all, while the remaining ones get
the required loan-size.
7 The pooling isoprot must not lie in the region that is delimitated by isoprot
; indi¤erence curve a, r-axis and contract . Bester assumes this condition to be
satised, see Bester (1985), note 12, p. 853.
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describing more precisely the sequence of market transactions which is posited
by Bester.
With regard to the sequence of transactions, the timing of the model can be
illustrated as follows (g.2):
In the time-line above, we have uninformed agents (banks) moving rst: they
devise debt contracts to be o¤ered to the informed ones (borrowers) (see Hell-
wig 1987). But price terms of this contract, i.e. j, depend on the rate of
interest on deposits, so an equilibrium on this market must be computed be-
fore banks can actually o¤er loans. If so, banks who have decided to enter
the loans market must go rst on the deposits market, where they demand a
quantity of loanable funds corresponding to the credit probabilities they are
going to o¤er and to the expected number of borrowers. The matching of these
demands with the supply of funds from savers, LS(), determines a notional
equilibrium rate of interest on deposits, f . This, in principle, need not be the
actual equilibrium rate as long as trading is not denitively closed (compare
however assumption 3 below). On the other hand, when o¤ers are made by
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banks, a generic borrower can observe this rate and he accordingly chooses one
of the two alternative options: investing his liquidity on the deposits market
or applying for his preferred credit-o¤er at a single bank. Once credit appli-
cations by borrowers have been done, banks randomly choose the individual
loans that are going to be nanced.
We are now in the position to describe in some detail the functioning of mar-
kets along with the extensive form of the game which a representative bank
plays with a generic borrower of a specied kind. In Besters model a symmet-
ric separating-equilibrium is considered, in which di¤erent banks and di¤erent
entrepreneurs of a given risk-class behave the same way. The rate of interest
on the market for deposits in a symmetric equilibrium in which banks o¤er
credit with a positive probability, and in which rms demand loans, can be
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determined as
 : LS() = B(N + 

N) (10)
where, obviously, the right-hand term of the equation is the bankstotal de-
mand of funds.
There is a large number of banks, E, and the market for loans is contestable.
A number of banks H < E that is su¢ cient to serve the whole market for
loans, will enter the credit market, therefore a borrower can be assured that
j is the actual probability of receiving a loan. The extensive form of the
simple game played by a representative bank, which plans to enter the credit
market, and by a generic borrower of type i may be depicted as in gure 3
below. Herein, Sj  (j; j) is the loan o¤er - which probability determines
the equilibrium rate of interest on deposits , i(j) =  and i  i(j);
whileX is the absolute value of the loss that a bank incurs when entrepreneurs
should refuse its contract o¤er: i.e. the value of the deposit contracts. Strategy
E denotes exit from the credit market, A is the acceptance of the loan o¤er;
L and NL, respectively, stand for according a loan or not, and such strategies
are randomly chosen by the bank. As for trading on the market for deposits is
concerned, it must be observed that the following assumption has to be made:
Assumption 3: Trading on this market is completed before borrowers accept
credit o¤ers, so the deposits market precedes the loans market, i.e. denitive
xing of the rate of interest and execution of the deposit contracts - by banks
and savers - take place before the market for loans closes.
On the contrary, suppose that banks can sign deposit contracts after having
observed the entrepreneursdecision to accept or not the loan o¤er. Then,
when borrowers found it favourable to refuse their preferred credit o¤er, be-
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cause ji(j ) < W (1 + 
), banks would not demand funding anymore on
the deposits market and would go to zero. If this occurs, payo¤s from the
equilibrium sequence fSj; Eg would simply be (W; 0), on this basis it cannot
be excluded that ji(j ) > W . From this we have an obvious comment on
the trading structure: if closure of trade on the deposits and on loans market
was simultaneous then, in equilibrium, entrepreneurs could demand a loan
even if their participation constraint (IR) to the credit market was violated.
This explains the necessity of assumption 3.
Now that the basic framework of Besters model has been described, let us
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consider a simple implication of his pivotal Assumption 2.
Lemma 1
Assumption 2 implies a second stage of the credit market, in which banks o¤er
the new set of contracts to rationed borrowers and demand additional funding
on the deposits market.
Proof. Suppose not. Then assumption 2 would entail a market in which banks
demand funding just once and o¤er borrowers a lottery over loan contracts
(; 

), where each lottery yields zero prot to a bank. The lottery is such
that a type a rm will be o¤ered contract  and a credit-probability 

,
while in the event that it should be rationed at this contract (an outcome
which has probability 1   ) this rm will be o¤ered contract  and a
credit-probability . Mutatis mutandum, the same goes for a type b rm.
In this market environment, Besters IR and IC constraints (7)-(9) and the
zero-prot condition i(j ) = 
 do not hold anymore, while the proof of his
Theorem 1 is inapplicable.
Before we go further, another minor - but useful - observation can be ad-
vanced in relation to the di¤erential information among banks, that can arise
at stage two of the credit market: with a separating equilibrium, at the end
of the rst credit market an incumbent bank knows the risk features of its
customers/borrowers, while a bank which is a potential entrant does not. This
shows the feasibility of the pivotal assumption 2. Obviously, it is due to the
fact that - in the rst credit market - the equilibrium pair of contracts (; 

)
is incentive compatible and self-selection of borrowers is induced. So, Lemma
1 tells us that, in the event of rationing, assumption 2 yields a second stage of
the credit market, a stage in which incumbent banks o¤er a specic contract
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- namely the one that was designed for the other type - to borrowers they
have just rationed. Thus, with regard to the extensive form of the game, the
presence of rationing in equilibrium adds a second game tree to the initial one;
this new tree has the same general structure of the rst (see g. 3 above) and
di¤ers only in the agents payo¤s. Accordingly, we can point out
Remark 1
The extensive form of the whole game is not indepedent from the type of
equilibrium that has to be determined.
4. Equilibrium with rationing or not?
We are now going to discuss the central issue: what credit probabilities (; 

)
must be assigned to the incentive-compatible equilibrium pair of contracts
(; 

)? Besters theorem 1 argues that these probabilities equal one.
Proposition 1 (Besters result)
Let f(; ); (; ); g be a credit market equilibrium at stage one, and
let both contracts  and 

 be demanded by entrepreneurs. Moreover these
contracts are incentive compatible. Then in a credit market equilibrium there
is no rationing at  or at 

, i.e. 

 = 

 = 1.
Proof. See Bester (1985), pp. 853-854
Besters proof is by contradiction. He denies that credit probabilities equal one
in the incentive-compatible equilibrium, and then shows that, in presence of
rationing of some fraction of rms, there exists a deviating credit o¤er which
warrants a positive prot to a generic entrant bank. This is a contradiction
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to requirement (i) of the denition of an equilibrium 8 , thus the proposition
is proven.
Comment. Anyway, the deviating o¤er could be allowed only by the way of
assumption 2. In fact, this assumption puts, in the second stage of the credit
market, a completely-arbitrary restriction on the strategy set of the incumbent
banks. In the rst credit market, these banks can freely determine their credit
o¤ers, while in the second market assumption 2 forces their strategy set - for
a rationed borrower of a given type - to be made up of the remaining contract
o¤ered at stage one: (; 

) for a type b rm, (

; 

) for a type a rm. On
the contrary, entrant banks - Besters "competing banks" - have access to an
unrestricted set of strategies. In this setting, incumbent banks do not actually
o¤er the above contracts to rationed borrowers 9 , while their reservation utility
reduces to W (1 + ). If so, a deviating protable o¤er by an entrant bank
can be easily made to exist.
These observations clearly indicate that we could be in presence of a formal
fallacy - due to assumption 2 - which should invalidate Besters result. To
check this, the logical problem has to be properly set up, that is:
a) the strategy set of incumbent banks must not be restricted when there is
rationing- as it is actually contemplated for the no-rationing equilibrium;
b) the extensive form of the game tree must be given independently from the
type of equilibrium we are solving for.
8 See denition 1 given above, p. 6.
9 An incumbent bank would earn a negative prot on type b borrowers. On the
contrary, it could earn a positive prot on type a borrowers, but these wont demand
this contract. See Bester (1985), p. 853.
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These two logical requirements imply the removal of assumption 2. Therefore,
we can limit ourselves to ascertain what happens in a credit market equilibrium
which game tree is entirely described by gure 3 above, that is stage one of
the credit market. Herein, we derive our main result
Proposition 2
Let f(; ); (; ); g be a credit market equilibrium at stage one, and
let both contracts  and 

 be demanded by entrepreneurs. Moreover these
contracts are incentive compatible and assumption 2 does not hold. Then in a
credit market equilibrium there can be rationing at (; 

); i.e. 

 = 

 < 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Comment. Essentially, we prove the impossibility to construct a protable de-
viating o¤er in presence of rationing. It can be even remarked that an identical
result is obtained if we are ready to abandon requirement b), thus allowing for
a second stage of the credit market 10 . Nevertheless, note that this recourse
opening would have no economic or behavioural justication in this static
credit model: banks have already screened and rationed their borrowers, and
have no motivation for o¤ering rationed borrowers a new contract. We con-
clude that Besters result on the absence of rationing is a circular reasoning
based on the arbitrary restriction of the strategy set which is imposed, in the
occurrence of rationing, on the sole incumbent banks.
10 In this case it su¢ ces to apply our proof to the subgame consisting of the second
stage of the credit market. The equilibrium is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
with rationing both at stage one and stage two of the credit market.
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5. Discussion
In this model, we have argued that an equilibrium with separation of bor-
rowers is compatible with rationing. If banks x a credit probability less than
one, then equilibrium rationing 11 arises as a coordination failure among risk-
neutral agents. When the market for loans is contestable 12 there is no way
for banks to design a protable deviant contract-pair that satises individual
rationality of entrepreneurs and enhances their probability of credit.
The occurrence of rationing in a separating equilibrium questions the e¢ ciency
of collateral as a screening instrument of borrowersriskiness. Hitherto, when
compared to a pooling equilibrium, the costs associated with the introduction
of collateral have been justied by the social gains ensuing from the elimination
of rationing in a separating equilibrium, viz. a strict increase in the number of
social e¢ cient investment projects undertaken, i.e. projects for which E
n eRo 
I(1 + ) > 0. Conversely, as we have argued, credit rationing can resist the
introduction of collateral, then the number of these projects is not necessarily
higher than that of a pooling equilibrium, while less-risky borrowers have
to pay the cost for it, out of their collateralizable wealth. In the separating
equilibrium we examined, social surplus V is given as:
V = N
h
E
n eRo  I(1 + )i N  kC
where N is the number of entrepreneurs who receives a loan, while the second
addend represents the cost of pledging collateral, borne by type a entrepre-
neurs. Clearly, if the number of nanced projects is not su¢ ciently increasing,
11 For a denition of equilibrium rationing, see Ja¤e-Stiglitz (1990), pp.847-849.
12 For a denition a contestable market see Baumol-Panzar-Willig (1982).
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to compensate for collateral costs, social surplus will diminish and the use of
collateral in credit contracts will not result in a socially-e¢ cient outcome 13 .
Finally, we can discuss the relationship of our analysis with the literature. To
our knowledge, the aws of Bester (1985) analysis have never been detected.
For this reason, perhaps, it has been generally taken for granted that introduc-
ing collateral in an analytical framework à la Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) would have
denitely excluded rationing from its credit market equilibrium 14 . We note
that our conclusion o¤ers a substantial, and totally unexpected, extension of
the validity of the rst Stiglitz-Weiss explanation for rationing, which relied on
pooling and on a di¤erent concept of equilibrium. Basically, to be emphasized
is that rationing in a separating allocation, with risk-neutral entrepreneurs and
a solution that is not bound by borrowers endowment of collateral, can now
be achieved. Contrary to Stiglitz-Weiss (1992), to explain equilibrium credit-
rationing, we show that there is no need to assume the joint presence of adverse
selection, moral hazard and the entrepreneursrisk-aversion. But, most of all,
the characteristic that confers generality to our result is the slackness of the
collateral constraint. In fact, when indivisible projects are available, a bind-
ing constraint has constituted the key assumption to reach a credit-rationing
equilibrium in presence of both collateral and separation of borrowers. This
binding condition has been equally shared by models with diverse speci-
13Anyway, consider that an increase in N will be partly o¤set by the following
increase in the equilibrium rate of interest on deposits, and in the size of collateral
costs as well.
14 Stiglitz-Weiss (1992) themselves implicitly adhered to Besters view, by consid-
erably modifying their model in order to defend the possibility of rationing as an
equilibrium phenomenon.
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cations (see Besanko-Thakor 1987, Bester 1987, Stiglitz-Weiss 1992 15 ). Not
surprisingly, as we have examined Besters model, our competitive-equilibrium
concept di¤ers from that of Stiglitz-Weiss (1981), where banks maximized the
depositorsrate of return as they were monopolistic competitors on the mar-
ket for loanable funds. Nevertheless, it is identical to the Stiglitz-Weiss (1992)
concept. As for this point, observe that: a) the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) denition
of equilibrium is a more conducive assumption for equilibrium rationing (see
Chan-Thakor 1987); b) considering banks that are monopolistic competitors
for deposits would easily bring about equilibrium-rationing in Besters frame-
work 16 . Therefore, the use of a di¤erent concept of equilibrium adds to the
signicance of our main conclusion.
Remarkably, our proposition about the coexistence of screening and equilib-
rium rationing does not stand in contrast with the results of Gale (1996). This
general contribution follows a walrasian approach, in a risk-neutral context
where each contract makes up a single market and agents take the probability
of being able to exchange any particular contract as given. Price terms are
exogenous, i.e. dened only implicitly by contracts which are indeed identied
with probability distributions over a set of outcomes, so that markets are to be
balanced by adjusting the probability of trade. Herein, Gale proves that equi-
librium rationing will not be observed unless agents are indi¤erent to trade
15 Besanko-Thakor (1987) and Bester (1987), diverging partly from Stiglitz-Weiss
(1981), employ a perfectly elastic supply of deposits along with risk-neutrality. On
their part, Stiglitz-Weiss (1992) start from a not perfectly elastic supply of deposits
and risk averse entrepreneurs.
16Here, the increase in the interest rate on deposits, which ensues to the deviant-
bank o¤er, invalidates the proof of proposition 1.
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(i.e. borrowers get their reservation utility), the result depending on an as-
sumption which is a generalization of the familiar single-crossing property.
Nevertheless, we point out that rationing in our case does not contradict Gales
theorem, in that it can be easily ascertained that a single-crossing property
holds but the rst part of Gales assumption is clearly violated 17 . In fact, in
a Rothschild-Stiglitz kind of analysis, like that we followed, we have no nite-
ness of the space of contracts. This could indeed be a reason for that violation
and for the fact that, if put in this di¤erent context, Gales assumption may
reveal to be quite stronger than the familiar single-crossing property 18 .
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
The only route to prove the possibility of a protable deviating o¤er is that
of ascertaining - for any arbitrary credit probability  < 1 - the existence
of price terms j such that i(j) > i(j ) and i(j) > 0, j = ;  and
i = a; b; hence, j  j . That is to say, the deviating o¤er we are searching
for has credit probability j = 1 and price terms j, which are - for borrowers
- slightly worse than j in order to allow for a positive bank-prot. Following
Bester, we can think of j as being di¤erent from j only because of a small
increase in the rate of interest rj > rj , while collateral stays unchanged, i.e.
j = (rj; C

j ): In principle, this problem may appear easy to solve. In fact,
17 Part (i) of Assumption 1, see Gale (1996), par. 7, pp.221-223. Compare g. 1
above.
18 See Gale (1996), p. 212 on the nite support of the allocation functions. In his
environment, Gale claims the rst part of his assumption 1 to be quite mild;
ibidem, p. 222.
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expected-utility i(:) is a continuous function which is monotone with respect
to r, because its partial derivative ri (:) is always negative. Then function i(:)
can be inverted and a threshold value rj > rj , such that i(j) = 
i(j ),
can be determined. Afterwards, we can choose rj as the highest value that
satises r < rj, so that i(j) > i(j ) with rj > r

j would generally follow.
Note, however, that  can be arbitrarily near to 1 and, as a consequence, rj
and rj can be practically indistinguishable (rj ' rj ). In practice, it is di¢ cult
to a¢ rm that the sought after deviating o¤er will exist for any  < 1. This
is conrmed by a more rigorous analysis.
In an incentive-compatible equilibrium i = j: By means of Lagranges for-
mula on nite increments, we can express the positive increment in borrowers
expected utility, which would follow from an increase in the probability of
receiving a loan, as
j(

j )(1  ) =  rj(0j)(rj   rj ) (11)
where 0j = (r
0
j; C

j ) and r

j < r
0
j < rj; 
r
j(:) =  B
Z R
B(1+r) C
fj(R)dR =
 B [1  Fj(B(1 + r)  C)] < 0 j = a; b, will denote the partial derivative of
the type-j utility function with respect to r. Note that rj is the level of the
rate of interest which absorbs all of the surplusensuing from the increase in
the credit probability; rj is a decreasing function of :
The increment in utility given by (11) will be partly o¤set by the increase in
the rate of interest, which is required to yield a positive prot to a deviating
bank. Employing again Lagranges formula, the decrement in utility can be
given as
rj(
00j )(rj   rj ) (12)
where 00j = (r
00
j ; C

j ) and r

j < r
00
j < rj; where rj is the rate of interest xed in
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the deviating o¤er. Clearly rj  rj:
Then, a necessary condition for the existence of the sought deviating credit-
o¤er is
 rj(0j)(rj   rj ) + rj(00j )(rj   rj ) > 0 (13)
which reduces to
(rj   rj )
(rj   rj )
>
rj(
00j )
rj(
0j)
(14)
Obviously, the condition cannot be satised whenever rj = rj. However, the
required inequality need not to be satised even in the case of interest, that is
when rj < rj. In fact, the second order derivative of the expected utility with
respect to the rate of interest has a uniform sign: rrj > 0 This implies that
r00j < r
0
j; but then both members of inequality (14) are greater than one and
we cannot tell whether this inequality is satised or not. Moreover, for values
of  approaching 1 it can be demonstrated that the inequality is certainly
violated.
As for this, consider that  = 1 implies rj = rj = rj , while from 
 < 1 it
follows rj > rj and rj > r

j : Moreover, when 
 ' 1 the left and right-hand
members of the inequality are approximately equal to one, because rj; rj; r0j
and r00j can be taken to be as practically coincident. Then, the e¤ects of a
decrease in  - in the neighbourhood of 1 - can be reckoned by means of the
rst-order derivative with respect to rj; valued at rj = rj. The e¤ects on the
left-hand and on the right-hand member of (14) are, respectively:
  1
(rj   rj )
(15)
rrj (
00j )
rj(
0j)
(16)
Both derivatives are negative, but observe that the modulus of the former
21
is strictly greater than the latter, because rj ' rj : This proves that (14) is
violated.
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